First Battle of Panipat: How Babur Established Mughal Empire
“Babur during all his campaigns and struggles was fearless and contemptuous of danger. His stirring addresses to the forces he led were no idle boasts, but the sincere expressions of a man who visioned high destiny and who possessed the energy and courage to translate his dream into actuality. The Tiger was ever in the forefront of battle at the crucial moment.”
- Lt. Commander (US Navy) P. J. Searles
There are moments when history is made and the early hours of 21 April 1526 fits the description. On that Friday, Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur, ruler of Kabul, Balkh, and Samarkand decisively defeated Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, the sovereign of Delhi, at Panipat. Thus inaugurating the Mughal empire in India, which would emerge as one of the most formidable empires the World has ever seen.
Why am I calling it an epoch making event? Why is the First Battle of Panipat so important? Why did a US Army officer in the 20th century call Babur, the Tiger?
What happened at Panipat on 21 April 1526, was one of the greatest military wins of a much smaller number against a superior army which changed the course of history. Babur set out from present day Afghanistan on November 17, 1525 to assist the rebel Doulat Khan, who had called on Babur against the Sultan of Delhi, Ibrahim Lodi. But, the real dream was to conquer Delhi and hence a large part of India. According to Baburnama he crossed Indus with a total of twelve thousand men. Of these twelve thousand, no more than sixty percent were actual fighting men, yielding an effective combat strength of approximately seven to eight thousand.
By the last week of February 1526, Ibrahim Lodi started feeling the heat and a march was ordered to stop Babur’s army which was coming towards Delhi conquering every town on the way. On 26 February, Humayun made an impressive debut as an army general by leading a successful march against Hamid Khan, military collector of Hisar, and captured Hisar. This was the last nail in the coffin. Ibrahim Lodi had to act now.
Babur received a message on 13 March that Ibrahim Lodi was marching towards them from Delhi. He camped himself near Sarsawa, at the banks of Yamuna. Meanwhile, his men started raiding the Lodi army and on 2 April captured Hatim Khan Lodi after laying an ambush.
Babur had few army men compared to Lodi. While he was commanding less than 10,000 soldiers, Lodi’s army had almost 100,000 men. Babur needed a superior strategy to win this battle of unequals.
In his memoirs, Babur wrote, “At our next camp it was ordered that every man in the army should collect carts, each one according to his circumstances Seven hundred carts (araba) were brought in. The order given to Ustad ‘Ali-quli was that these carts should be joined together in Ottoman fashion, but using ropes of raw hide instead of chains, and that between every two carts 5 or 6 mantelets should be fixed, behind which the matchlockmen were to stand to fire. To allow for collecting all appliances, we delayed 5 or 6 days in that camp. When everything was ready, all the begs with such braves as had had experience in military affairs were summoned to a General Council where opinion found a decision at this:- Panipat is there with its crowded houses and suburbs. It would be on one side of us; our other sides must be protected by carts and mantelets behind which our foot and matchlockmen would stand. With so much settled we marched forward, halted one night on the way, and reached Panipat on Thursday, the last day (29th) of the second Jumada (April 13th).”
Babur discovered that his line was shorter than anticipated. To attain victory over a larger army he needed to coordinate use of artillery and cavalry in a combined-arms engagement. For this, Babur’s flanking cavalry had to be able to sweep around the ends of the enemy’s line. This meant that his own front matched or exceeded the enemy front in length.
To solve the problem Babur marched to Panipat, then a large and populous city. By positioning his right flank against the town’s buildings and suburbs, he anchored it naturally. For the fortification of the left flank a ditch was dug and an abatis of felled branches was made. These measures freed his small army from the need to hold both flanks actively.
In spite of this numerical mismatch of 1:10, Babur was confident of his military strategy and unworthiness of Ibrahim Lodi. He wrote, “People estimated the army opposing us at 100,000 men; Ibrahim’s elephants and those of his amirs were said to be about 1000. In his hands was the treasure of two forbears. Hindustan, when work such as this has to be done, it is customary to pay out money to hired retainers who are known as bed-hindi. If it had occurred to Ibrahim to do this, he might have had another lak or two of troops. God brought it right! Ibrahim could neither content his braves, nor share out his treasure. How should he content his braves when he was ruled by avarice and had a craving insatiable to pile coin on coin? He was an unproved brave; he provided nothing for his military operations, he perfected nothing, nor stand, nor move, nor fight.”
On Friday, 21 April 1526, Ibrahim Lodi marched on Babur’s camp in Panipat after almost a week of flirtations. A common perception is that Babur won because of the employment of guns at Panipat which took Ibrahim Lodi’s army by surprise. This is not the case according to military historians.
Searles noted, “Many students of Babur’s military career have failed to realize the exact significance of his line of wagons. S. Lane Poole and other writers have considered the wagon line as a movable fortress behind which the infantry might hope to escape, or have compared it to the ” laager’ ‘ or wagon units of the Hussites in their battles against the heavy cavalry of the Empire. In reality, the Tiger did not construct a fortress or rampart for, if such had been his intent, he would have drawn up his wagons in a continuous line or would have arranged them in a square. Of course, the line sheltered the infantry and artillery, but it did more – and this is a vital point – it contained gaps through which Babur ‘s cavalry could debouch against an enemy already demoralized by unexpected gunfire. The wagon line was a stratagem of aggression rather than of defense, merely a temporary shelter to be left behind when the moment came for the charge of the well-trained cavalry.”
The formation Babur made with 700 carts, houses of Panipat, ditches and trees were more important in winning the war than guns, which were not numerous and had little firepower.
Searles admired Babur and said, “The army of the Tiger was drawn up behind its wagons and breastworks in traditional formation- “that formation which, though elaborated by Timur, goes back in all essentials to the military traditions of the Chinese. Right, center, left and van were there, just as the author of the Sun Tzu laid down in the sixth century B. C. ; while in the presence of the large reserve, of the flanking parties on the extremity of each wing, and of the division of the center into the right and left, we discern the improvements to which Timur owed so much of his success.” Ustad Ali with the heavy artillery was on the right of the center, and Mustafa with the matchlockmen on the left. Babur, himself, was near the center of his army, in a position which best enabled him to watch the progress of the battle and to make such dispositions as events might require. He had no intention of allowing the enemy the advantage of the initiative, and had warned his flanking parties to hold themselves in readiness for delivering a blow directly if the enemy should advance within striking distance.”
The Afghan army advanced swiftly at first, straight toward Babur’s position. But seeing the wagon line, the mantlets, and the organized Mughal array, it hesitated. The Babur-nama records,: “From the time that Sultan Ibrahim’s blackness first appeared, he moved swiftly, straight for us, without a check, until he saw the dark mass of our men, when he pulled up and, observing our formation and array, made as if asking, ‘To stand or not? To advance or not?'”
Turning parties of Mughals then wheeled around both ends of the Afghan line and began raining arrows into their rear. Artillery and matchlockmen fired from the center into the compressed, immobilized Afghan mass. Reinforcements were continuously sent to wherever pressure was greatest. When the right center under Chin-timur Sultan and others disengaged as their sector was won, Babur ordered the general frontal charge through the wagon-line gaps.
By noon, the Lodi army was completely defeated and Ibrahim Lodi was killed.
Babur’s own initial estimate was that five or six thousand men were killed in one place close to Ibrahim’s position and a total of fifteen to sixteen thousand Afghans. But later Baburnama noted that “it came to be known later in Agra from the statements of Hindustanis that forty or fifty thousand may have died in that battle.”
Ibrahim’s body was found by Tahir Tibri, a younger brother-in-law of Khalifa, among a heap of the dead. Babur, according to the Tarikh-i-salatin-i-afghana cited in the Baburnama footnotes, went to the spot, lifted the dead sultan’s head, and said, “Honour to your courage,” before ordering the body bathed in brocade and buried where it lay.
Searles said about Babur, “Perhaps the words of an old writer may serve as an epitaph: Let it suffice to say that he possessed eight fundamental qualities ; lofty judgment, noble ambition, the art of victory, the art of government, the art of conferring prosperity upon his people, the talent of ruling mildly the people of God, ability to win the hearts of his soldiers, love of justice.”
(Views expressed by the author are personal & do not represent Heritage Times)
